Improved Extractors for Recognizable and Algebraic Sources by Li, Fu & Zuckerman, David
Improved Extractors for Recognizable and
Algebraic Sources
Fu Li
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at Austin, USA
fuli2015@cs.utexas.edu
David Zuckerman
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at Austin, USA
diz@cs.utexas.edu
Abstract
We study the task of seedless randomness extraction from recognizable sources, which are uniform
distributions over sets of the form {x : f(x) = 1} for functions f in some specified class C. We give
two simple methods for constructing seedless extractors for C-recognizable sources.
Our first method shows that if C admits XOR amplification, then we can construct a seedless
extractor for C-recognizable sources by using a mildly hard function for C as a black box. By
exploiting this reduction, we give polynomial-time, seedless randomness extractors for three natural
recognizable sources: (1) constant-degree algebraic sources over any prime field, where constant-
degree algebraic sources are uniform distributions over the set of zeros of a system of constant
degree polynomials; (2) sources recognizable by randomized multiparty communication protocols of
cn bits, where c > 0 is a small enough constant; (3) halfspace sources, or sources recognizable by
linear threshold functions. In particular, the new extractor for each of these three sources has linear
output length and exponentially small error for min-entropy k ≥ (1− α)n, where α > 0 is a small
enough constant.
Our second method shows that a seed-extending pseudorandom generator with exponentially
small error for C yields an extractor with exponentially small error for C-recognizable sources,
improving a reduction by Kinne, Melkebeek, and Shaltiel [16]. Using the hardness of the parity
function against AC0 [13], we significantly improve Shaltiel’s extractor [25] for AC0-recognizable
sources. Finally, assuming sufficiently strong one-way permutations, we construct seedless extractors
for sources recognizable by BPP algorithms, and these extractors run in quasi-polynomial time.
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1 Introduction
Randomness is needed for many applications, such as statistics, algorithms and cryptography.
However, most physical sources are not truly random, in the sense that they can have
substantial biases and correlations. Weak random sources can also arise in cryptography
when an adversary can learn partial information about a uniformly random string.
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A natural approach to dealing with weak random sources is to apply a randomness
extractor – a function that transforms a weak random source into an almost-perfect random
source. However, it is impossible to give a single function that extracts even one bit of
randomness from sufficiently general classes of sources [24]. There are two ways to combat
this. One is to extract with the help of another short random string. An object constructed
in this manner is called a seeded extractor [21]. The focus of this paper is the second way:
to extract from more structured sources (without using additional random bits). Such a
function is called a seedless, or deterministic, extractor.
More formally, a random source X is modeled as a probability distribution over n bit
strings with some entropy k. In the context of randomness extraction, the standard measure
of entropy is the so called min-entropy – the min-entropy k of a source X is defined as
H∞(X) = mins(log(1/Pr[X = s])). Then, the definition of a seedless extractor can be
presented as follows.
I Definition 1 (Seedless extractors for structured sources). Let D be a class of distributions
over {0, 1}n. We say a function Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a (k, )-extractor for D if for any
distribution D ∈ D with min-entropy at least k, we have
Ext(D) ≈ Um,
where Um denotes the uniform distribution over {0, 1}m and ≈ stands for -close in statistical
distance (Definition 16).
By the probabilistic method, it is known that for any constant α > 0 and any distribution
family D of at most 22(1−α)k sources of min-entropy k, there is a seedless extractor outputting
m = (1− α)k bits with error 2−αk/3.
A large body of research has been devoted to constructing explicit seedless extractors for
various structured sources. There are mainly two natural perspectives to limit the structure
of a distribution: an algebraic perspective and a computational perspective.
The algebraic perspective is to impose some algebraic structure on the distribution, such
as an affine source [5]. Later, affine sources were generalized to distributions defined using
low-degree polynomials. On one hand, Dvir, Gabizon and Wigderson [10] studied polynomial
sources, which are the images of low-degree polynomial maps. On the other hand, viewing
an affine source as the kernel, or set of zeros, of an affine mapping, Dvir [9] introduced the
class of sources sampled uniformly from kernels or sets of common zeros of one or more
polynomials, which he called algebraic sources1.
The computational perspective is to assume a distribution has “low complexity”. This
started with Trevisan and Vadhan [27], who considered distributions that can be sampled
by efficient algorithms. They showed that constructing a seedless extractor for this class
is closely related to proving lower bound for circuits and gave a conditional construction
of such an extractor based on lower bound assumptions. Later, in [15], an unconditional
extractor was constructed for sources generated by space-bounded algorithms. More recently,
Viola [29] constructed a seedless extractor for AC0-samplable sources.
1 For clarification, in [9], Dvir mentioned sources which are distributed uniformly on varieties. A variety
is also a set of common zeros of one or more polynomials, but it is often defined to require the ground
field to be algebraically closed.
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1.1 Recognizable sources
We focus on recognizable sources, first suggested by Shaltiel [25]. Recognizable sources are
uniform distributions over sets of the form {x : f(x) = v} for functions f coming from some
specified class. Formally, for any boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, define the source
recognizable by f , denoted by Uf , as the uniform distribution over f−1(1). For short, we
call this distribution the f -recognizable source. For any boolean function family C, the set of
C-recognizable sources is the set of f -recognizable sources, for each f ∈ C.
This notion naturally interacts with the algebraic and computational perspectives to limit
the structure of a distribution, and also captures several distributions that were widely studied.
For example, distributions with algebraic structures are those distributions recognizable by
algebraic classes – affine sources are distributions recognizable by affine functions and algebraic
sources are distributions recognizable by products of low-degree polynomials. Moreover,
distributions that have “low complexity” could also be the distributions recognizable by
low-complexity classes, such as small circuits.
Shaltiel [25] initially proposed an extractor for recognizable sources. He showed that
such extractors produced randomness that was in some sense not correlated with the input
and hence could be used for derandomization. In particular, to derandomize any class
of randomized algorithms, he needed to explicitly construct an extractor for distributions
recognizable by the class. He showed that without further changes, some appropriate known
extractors could work for distributions recognizable by decision trees, streaming algorithms,
and AC0. What’s more, assuming average-case hardness against polynomial-size circuits, he
showed that applying the hard function on disjoint blocks of the input was an extractor for
distributions recognizable by general polynomial-time algorithms.
Later, Kinne, Melkebeek and Shaltiel [16] improved the derandomization results in [25]
by using “seed-extending pseudorandom generators”, which are pseudorandom generators
that reveal their seed. They gave reductions between seed-extending PRGs and extractors
for recognizable sources. However, both Shaltiel [25] and this later paper [16] focused on
derandomization rather than constructing new extractors.
1.2 XOR Amplification
Given a boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, let f⊕m(x1, . . . , xm) :=
⊕
i∈[m] f(xi) denote
the XOR of m independent copies of f . The XOR Amplification Lemma2 states that if a
function f is hard on average for some computational class C, (i.e., f cannot be computed
correctly by any function in C on at most a (1/2 + p)-fraction of of the inputs), then f⊕m
cannot be computed correctly on at most a (1/2 + pΩ(m))-fraction of of the inputs. Loosely
speaking, the hardness of f is amplified when the outputs of independent copies of f are
XOR together. Indeed, this idea is analogous to the information theoretic setting. If f is a
biased coin with Pr[f = 1] = 1/2 + p, then the XOR of m independent biased coins, f⊕m,
induces a coin with Pr[f⊕m = 1] = 1/2− (−2p)m/2. However, showing that such an idea
holds in the computational setting is significantly more involved.
There are several works dedicated to proving XOR amplification for computational models.
Yao [31] first suggested XOR amplification, and proved that XOR (hardness) amplification
held for polynomial-size circuits. Unfortunately, the amplification stops when XORing more
than logarithmically many copies, which makes it not so useful for us. Later, Viola and
2 This is usually called simply the XOR lemma, or Yao’s XOR lemma, but we want to distinguish it from
a different XOR lemma.
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Wigderson [30] showed XOR amplification for multi-party communication complexity and
polynomials over GF(2). Subsequently, their proof was extended by Bogdanov, Kawachi and
Tanaka [4], to prove XOR amplification for polynomials over any prime field.
In this paper, we give a new application of XOR amplification – constructing seedless
extractors for recognizable sources.
2 Overview of our results
2.1 From XOR amplification to Extractors for recognizable sources
It is folklore that one can use correlation bounds to extract a single bit. In this paper, we use
XOR amplification to extend the output length from one bit to linear in the input length.
Intuitively, XOR amplification states that if a function f is hard on average for some
complexity class C of Boolean functions, then f⊕m(x1, . . . , xm) = f(x1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ f(xm) is
exponentially harder on average. We actually only need a weaker condition: that there exists
some h for which h⊕k gets exponentially harder.
More precisely, let C ⊆ {{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}} be a class of Boolean functions. For a positive
constant α, we say C has α-XOR amplification if there exists a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}
such that for any positive integer k, the correlation between h⊕k and g is no more than 2−αk,
for any g ∈ C.
We show that if C is closed under restrictions and C has α-XOR amplification, then there
is an efficient extractor for Cn-recognizable sources, where Cn denotes the set of all n-variate
functions in C.
I Theorem 2. Let C ⊆ {{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}} be any boolean function class closed under
restrictions and α be any positive constant. If C has α-XOR amplification, then for any positive
integer n, there is an explicit seedless ((1− β)n, 2−Ω(αn)) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
for Cn-recognizable sources, where β = Θ(α) > 0, m = Ω(αn), and Cn denotes the set of all
n-variate functions in C.
Our construction uses h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} from the definition of XOR amplification. Since
the function h is fixed, its input length t is a constant, and it is computable efficiently (by
hardwiring it). We also use the generator matrix M of an asymptotically good [l,m, r]-code,
where l = n/t, so the distance r = Ω(l) = Ω(n/t). Then Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is simply
Ext(x) = h(l)(x)M, where h(l)(x = (x1, . . . , xl)) = (h(x1), . . . , h(xl)).
Occasionally we will apply a variation of this theorem when t grows with n, in which case we
need h to be computable in time polynomial in n. For example, if the input length of h is
t = O(logn), then h should be computable in exponential time.
Li [18] uses a similar construction to extend the output length of two-source extractors
from one bit to more. Raz [22] had a related but different way to extend the output length
of his specific extractor using small biased spaces. Raz uses the XOR lemma, but his method
would not work with any asymptotically good code (as ours and Li’s does); in fact, Raz does
not even mention codes or distance.
2.1.1 Algebraic sources
An algebraic set is a set of common zeros of one or more multivariate polynomials defined
over a finite field F. An algebraic source is a random variable distributed uniformly over an
algebraic set, which was originally introduced by Dvir [9]. Algebraic sources are a natural
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generalization of affine sources that have been widely studied. Furthermore, we say that an
algebraic source has degree d if the algebraic source can be defined by polynomials of degree
at most d.
I Definition 3 (Algebraic extractor). We say that Ext : Fn → Fm is a (k, d, )-algebraic
extractor over F if for any degree-d algebraic source UV with |V | ≥ |F|k, Ext(UV ) ≈ Um.
Dvir obtained explicit extractors for degree-d algebraic sources with entropy rate greater
than 1/2 over moderately sized fields, where |F| = poly(d), and with small entropy rate over
large fields, where |F| = dΩ(n2).
Golovnev and Kulikov [12] related the study of Boolean dispersers for quadratic algebraic
sets to improving circuit lower bounds. A disperser is a relaxation of an extractor, which is
only required to output a non-constant bit from a weak random source. They posed the open
question of constructing a disperser for any algebraic set of size 20.03n and defined by using
at most 1.78n quadratic polynomials. Such a disperser yields a new circuit lower bound.
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there were only two papers on explicitly constructing
dispersers or extractors for algebraic sources over GF(2). Cohen and Tal [8] constructed
an extractor for algebraic sources defined by at most (log logn)1/(2e) quadratic polynomials.
They also constructed dispersers for algebraic sources defined by at most nα polynomials of
degree at most log0.1(n) for some constant α < 1. Our extractor construction subsumes both
their extractor and disperser, outputting nγ random bits for algebraic sources with higher
degree c logn and the same bound nα for the number of defining polynomials, where γ, c are
constants. Remscrim [23] constructed the best extractors before our work, outputting one
bit with error O(1/
√
n) for min-entropy n− nc for any c < 1/2. It can handle fairly large
degree, up to n1/2−α, where α > 0 is a constant. Our construction significantly improves
the extractor for constant-degree algebraic sources, outputting more bits and handling lower
min-entropy.
Using Theorem 2, we construct a seedless extractor for algebraic sources of constant
degree for some linear min-entropy. In particular, the new extractor has linear output
length and exponentially small error for min-entropy k ≥ (1− α)n, where α > 0 is a small
enough constant.
I Theorem 4. For any positive integer d, there is an efficient
(
(1− 1/cd)n, d, 2−Ω(n/cd)
)
-
algebraic extractor Ext : Fn2 → Fm2 , where cd = Θ(d24d), m = Ω(n/cd).
Even for degree c logn for a small enough constant c > 0, our extractor outputs nγ bits
with error 2−Ω(nα) for n− nα min-entropy, where γ, α > 0 are some constants.
We can extend our algebraic extractor to any prime field Fq.
I Theorem 5. For any positive integer d and any prime field Fq, there is an efficient(
(1− 1/cd,q)n, d, q−Ω(n/cd,q)
)
-algebraic extractor Ext : Fnq → Fmq , where cd,q =
Θ(d222dq3 log q), m = Ω(n/cd,q).
2.1.2 Sources recognizable by communication protocols
We consider a boolean function class that has low communication complexity. Communication
complexity was defined by Yao [32], who introduced a standard 2-party communication
model. Later, Chandra, Furst, and Lipton [6] generalized this to the multiparty model. In
a t-party communication NOF (number-on-forehead) model, each party holds a separate
input and each party knows all but its own input. These parties attempt to compute (or
approximate) a given function of these t inputs by exchanging few bits of communication. The
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complexity of a communication protocol is the number of bits exchanged on the worst input.
Both deterministic and randomized communication protocols are considered. A randomized
protocol can be viewed as a distribution on deterministic protocols.
For deterministic 2-party protocols, Shaltiel [25] already constructed an efficient extractor
that has linear output for linear min-entropy and exponentially small error. To do this, he
proved that 2-source extractors are also extractors for sources recognizable by deterministic
2-party protocols, and hence some known constructions of 2-source extractors could be used.
However, this approach is tailored to the 2-party case and does not generalize to the t-party
case for some t > 2.
We construct an extractor for sources recognizable by randomized t-party protocols.
Formally, we prove the following theorem.
I Theorem 6. There exists an explicit seedless ((1 − 1/ct)n, 2−c1n/ct) extractor Ext :({0, 1}n/t)t → {0, 1}c2n/ct for sources recognizable by randomized t-party communication
protocols of at most c3n/4t bits, where ct = Θ(t4t) and c1, c2, c3 are some positive constants.
This extractor has linear output for linear min-entropy and exponentially small error, and is
simply Ext(x) =
(
∧(l)t (x)
)
M , where l = n/t, ∧t is the AND function over t variables and M
is the l × (c2n/ct) generator matrix of a good linear code.
2.1.3 Halfspace sources
Halfspace sources are sources recognizable by linear threshold functions. A linear threshold
function (abbreviated LTF) is a boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that can be represented
as f(x) = 1∑
i∈n aixi>a0
for some constants a0, a1, . . . , an ∈ R. From a geometric perspective,
a boolean LTF is a halfspace-indicator to the discrete cube {0, 1}n.
We construct an efficient extractor that has linear output for linear min-entropy and
exponentially small error for halfspace sources.
I Theorem 7. There exists an explicit seedless ((1− c1)n, 2−c2n) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}c3n for halfspace sources, where c1, c2, c3 are some positive small enough constants.
The construction of this extractor is simply Ext(x) =
(
∧(l)2 (x)
)
M , where l = n/2, M is the
l × c3n generator matrix of a good linear code.
2.2 From Seed-extending PRGs to Extractors for recognizable sources
The Kinne et al. reductions between seed-extending pseudorandom generators and extractors
for recognizable distributions were asymmetric. They showed that an extractor with expo-
nentially small error yielded a seed-extending pseudorandom generator with exponentially
small error. However, they proved a weak converse.
In this paper, we prove that a seed-extending pseudorandom generator with exponentially
small error yields an extractor with exponentially small error. This applies to flip-invariant
families of boolean functions, which are invariant under flipping input bits (see Definition 26).
I Theorem 8. Let C be a flip-invariant family of boolean functions over n bits. If G
is a seed-extending (d, )-pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n for C, then for
any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0 we can construct an (n −∆, 2∆)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−d
for C-recognizable sources. Specifically, if G(x) = (x,E(x)) fools any function in C, then
Ext(x ◦ y) = y ⊕ E(x) is an (n − ∆,2∆)-extractor for C-recognizable sources, where x ∈
{0, 1}d, y ∈ {0, 1}m, where m = n− d.
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In particular, the reduction in [16] requires a tiny  ≤ 2−(m+2∆) for the seed-extending
PRG to get an (n−∆, 2−∆)-extractor. Moreover, the reduction in [16] breaks down for a seed-
extending PRG, G(x) = (x,E(x)), where E(x) is longer than x. We improve the reduction
from seed-extending PRGs to extractors to require only  ≤ 2−2∆, without depending on the
output length m. Furthermore, the new reduction can still work even for a seed-extending
PRG, G(x) = (x,E(x)), where E(x) is longer than x.
Based on this new reduction, we significantly improve extractors for two important types
of recognizable sources as follows.
2.2.1 Circuit-recognizable sources
Kinne et al. proved that the well-known Nisan-Wigderson pseudorandom generator construc-
tion [20] can be made seed-extending. Therefore, assuming hardness against small circuits,
we can construct an extractor for sources recognizable by small circuits.
I Proposition 9. For any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0 and positive integers l < n, if there is a function
H that is -hard at input length
√
l/2 for circuits of size s+ (n− l)2O(log(n−l)/ log l) and depth
d + 1, then we can get an (n −∆, (n − l)2∆)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l for any
sources recognizable by circuits of size s and depth d.
Using the hardness of the parity function against AC0 [13], we significantly improve
Shaltiel’s extractor [25] for AC0-recognizable sources.
I Theorem 10. For any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0 and positive integers l < n, there exists a polynomial
time computable (n −∆, (n − l)2∆−Ω(l1/(2d+2))) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l for any
sources recognizable by circuits of size 2n1/d and depth d.
In particular, for min-entropy n − n1/(αd), our extractor outputs n − n2/α+O(1/d) bits,
whereas Shaltiel’s extractor outputs only n1/(αd) bits. When α > 2d/(d−1) is a large enough
constant, our extractor outputs n−o(n) bits whereas Shaltiel’s extractor outputs only n1/(αd)
bits. For min-entropy n − polylog(n) bits, our extractor outputs n − polylog(n), whereas
Shaltiel’s extractor outputs only polylog(n) bits.
Our methods also apply to formulas. Komargodski, Raz and Tal [17] constructed an
explicit function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that is 2−Ω(r)-hard for any deMorgan formula of size
n3−o(1)/r2. Based on this hardness result, we can construct an efficient extractor for sources
recognizable by deMorgan formulas of size close to n3/2.
I Theorem 11. For any ∆, r, α > 0 and m ≤ (1 − α)n, there exists a polynomial time
computable (n−∆,m2∆−Ω(r))-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m for any sources recognizable
by deMorgan formulas of size n3/2−o(1)/r2.
2.2.2 Sources recognizable by efficient randomized algorithms
Note that there are no efficient seed-extending cryptographic PRGs. Otherwise, with revealed
seeds, it is easy to efficiently distinguish the output of an efficient seed-extending PRG,
G(x) = (x,E(x)), from a random string (x, y), by checking whether y equals E(x).
We show that there is an inefficient seed-extending cryptographic PRG implied by the
existence of one-way permutations. By our reduction, we show that a one-way permutation
with exponentially small error yields an (n− nΩ(1), 2−nΩ(1)) extractor extracting n− nO(1)
bits from sources recognizable by BPP algorithms. Formally, this follows by taking  = 2−cnα
and q(n) = nw(1) in the following theorem.
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I Theorem 12. For any polynomial-time computable functions t(·) and (·), assume that
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a one-way permutation with error (·) against t(·)-bounded invert-
ers. Then for any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0 and a positive constant δ < 1, we can construct an(
n−∆, O (2∆(nδ)cδ)) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−nδ for sources recognizable by ran-
domized algorithms running in time
(
t(nδ)
)cδ , where cδ is a constant depending on δ. The
running time of the extractor is a polynomial times the time to compute the inverse function
f−1 of the one-way permutation f with input length nδ. Due to the space limitation, we
prove the following theorem in the full version of this paper.
Furthermore, the running time of such an extractors will be quasi-polynomial if there exists
a sufficiently strong one-way permutations. In particular, by scaling down, we have the
following corollary.
I Corollary 13. For any constants a, b, c, δ > 0, assume that there exists a one-way permuta-
tion invertible in time O
(
2na
)
with error 2−nc against 2δnb-bounded inverters, Then, for any
positive constants α and β < 1, we can get an
(
n− cβ logcα (n) , O
(
2−cβ logcα(n)
))
extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−nβ for sources recognizable by randomized algorithms running in time
2cβδ logbα(n), where cβ is a constant depending on β.The running time of the extractor is
O
(
2log
aα(nβ)
)
.
3 Overview of our main constructions and proofs
3.1 From XOR amplification to Extractors
In this subsection, we describe how to construct a seedless extractor for C-recognizable
sources if there exists a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} such that for any g ∈ C and k ≤ n/t,
Cor(h⊕k, g) ≤ 2−Ω(k). Think of t = O(1).
We start with the statistical XOR lemma3, usually attributed to Vazirani. We say a
random variable Z over {0, 1} is -biased if bias(Z) = Cor(Z, 0) = |Pr[Z = 0] − Pr[Z =
1]| ≤ .
I Lemma 14 (Statistical XOR Lemma). Let X1, . . . , Xm be 0-1 random variables such that
for any nonempty S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, the random variable ⊕i∈S Xi is -biased. Then, the
distribution of (X1, . . . , Xm) is 2m/2-close to uniform.
Let gi(x) be the i-th bit of Ext(x) for each i ∈ [m]. Thus, to show that the output of Ext
is close to uniform, it suffices to show that for any non-empty set S ⊆ [m], gS =
∑
i∈S gi is
low-biased conditioned on f(x) = 1 for each f ∈ C. By XOR amplification, it is enough to
guarantee that each gS is the sum of Ω(n) independent copies of h, and hence gS has 2−Ω(n)
correlation with any function in C.
A linear code is a natural candidate to guarantee that each gS is the sum of Ω(n)
independent copies. Let h(l) : {0, 1}tl → {0, 1} denote the concatenation of l copies of h
and M be the generating matrix of an asymptotically good [l,m, r]2 code. Our construction
is simply
Ext(x) = (g1(x), . . . , gm(x)) = h(l)(x)M.
Finally, we observe that the bias of gS conditioned on f(x) = 1 can be bounded by the
correlation between gS and f plus the bias of gS .
3 The statistical XOR lemma is unrelated to the XOR amplification used in our proof.
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I Lemma 15. |Pr[gS(X) = 1|f(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 0|f(X) = 1]| ≤ Cor(gS ,f)+bias(gS)2 Pr[f(X)=1] .
That is, if we choose a good linear code, then Ext(x) = h(l)(x)M is an extractor for C-
recognizable sources with exponentially small error.
For details, see Section 5.
3.2 Algebraic extractors over GF(2)
In this subsection, we describe our algebraic extractor construction.
Notice that to construct a degree-d algebraic extractor that outputs only one bit, it is
enough to let the extractor have small correlation bounds with degree-d polynomials. This
fact is implicitly proved by Dvir [9] and observed by others, e.g., Eshan Chattopadhyay and
Avishay Tal (personal communication). Based on this fact, we combine XOR amplification
and linear codes to extend the output length form one bit to more.
First we observe that an algebraic source over n bits defined by n-variate polynomials
p1, . . . , pk is also a source recognizable by the product
∏
i∈[k](pi + 1). Let Vd denote the set
of all products of polynomials of degree at most d. Thus, for any positive integer n, to get
an extractor for n-bit algebraic sources of degree d, it suffices to construct an extractor for
Vd-recognizable sources over n bits. In particular, by the previous discussion, it suffices to
show that XOR amplification holds for Vd.
Second we observe that to show that a function f has low correlations with Vd, it suffices
to show that f has low correlation with any d-degree polynomials. This is because the L1
norm of the Fourier transform of the AND function is at most 2.
Viola and Wigderson [30] proved XOR amplification for low-degree polynomials over
GF(2). Specifically, if a Boolean function h over {0, 1}O(d) has correlation at most 1− 1/2d
with degree-d polynomials, then the correlation between h⊕l (see Section 1.2) and degree-d
polynomials drops exponentially with l. Such h are known.
For details, see Section A.1.
3.3 From seed-extending PRGs to Extractors
We start with a new reduction from pseudorandom generators to seedless extractors. Observe
that a seedless extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m partitions {0, 1}n as ⋃z∈{0,1}m Ext−1(z). If
Ext is a (k, )-extractor for C-recognizable sources, then for every f ∈ C with |f−1(1)| ≥ 2k,
most intersections Ext−1(z) ∩ f−1(1) should have almost the same size. That is, for most
m-bit strings z, the preimage Ext−1(z) is an -pseudorandom set against any f ∈ C with
|f−1(1)| ≥ 2k.
Now, given PRGs, how do we construct extractors? From the above observation, con-
verting an -pseudorandom set into a partition of -pseudorandom sets is a possible way. If
each preimage Ext−1(z) of Ext is an -pseudorandom set for C, Ext should be an extractor
for C-recognizable sources with a bit worse parameters.
To make Ext−1(z) an -pseudorandom set for each z, we need a seed-extending PRG
G(x), i.e., G(x) = x ◦ E(x) for some function E : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n−d. By linearly shifting
the set {(x,E(x))}, we can partition {0, 1}n as ⋃z∈{0,1}n−d {(x, (E(x)⊕ z)) : x ∈ {0, 1}d}.
We therefore define Ext(x, z) = E(x)⊕ z. Since C is a flip-invariant function family, we have
that the set Ext−1(z) =
{
(x, (E(x)⊕ z)) : x ∈ {0, 1}d} fools any function f in C.
For details, see Section 6.
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3.4 Algebraic extractors over prime fields
We remark that the main results used in building our algebraic extractor over GF(2) – the
XOR amplification, the statistical XOR lemma and the asymptotically linear code – all have
been extended to prime fields. Thus, to generalize our algebraic extractor, the remaining
technical parts are not hard.
Bogdanov, Kawachi and Tanaka [4] proved XOR amplification for low-degree polynomials
over prime fields, i.e., the sum of k independent copies of h was q−Ω(k)-hard for Pd if h was
mildly hard. However, besides the sum of copies, we require the same hardness result for
linear combinations of k copies of h. We prove this hardness result by using the original
proof of Bogdanov, Kawachi and Tanaka with some slight modifications. The main revision
of our proof uses the fact that the Gowers norm is multiplicative for functions over disjoint
sets of input variables.
Furthermore, over a prime field Fq, an algebraic source over n bits defined by n-variate
polynomials p1, . . . , pk is a source recognizable by the product
∏
i∈[k](1− pq−1i ). We need to
analyze the product of the special form
∏
i∈[k](1− xq−1i ), as an analog of the AND function
over GF(2).
The reason we assume prime fields in our results is that XOR amplification for polynomials
is known only over prime fields.
For details, please check the full version of this paper.
4 Preliminaries
In the following, for any two binary strings x, y, let x ◦ y denote their concatenation, and let
x⊕ y denote their bitwise XOR when x and y have the same length.
I Definition 16 (Statistical distance). Let D1 and D2 be two distributions over a set S. Define
the statistical distance between D1 and D2 as |D1−D2| = 12
∑
s∈S |Pr[D1 = s]− Pr[D2 = s]| .
We say D1 is -close to D2, denoted by D1 ≈ D2, if |D1 −D2| ≤ .
I Definition 17 (Recognizable source). For any boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, define
the source recognizable by f , denoted by Uf , as the uniform distribution over f−1(1). For
short, we call this distribution the f -recognizable source.
For any boolean function family C, the set of C-recognizable sources is the set of f-
recognizable sources for f ∈ C.
For l ∈ N, let Ul denote the uniform distribution on l bits.
I Definition 18 (Extractor for recognizable sources [25]). Let C be a class of functions
C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. We say that Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a (k, )-extractor for C-
recognizable sources if for every f ∈ C such that ∣∣f−1(1)∣∣ ≥ 2k, Ext(Uf ) ≈ Um.
Note that when the output length m = 1, the extractor is simply a boolean function
which has low correlation with any function in C.
4.1 Algebraic sources
An algebraic set is a set of common zeros of one or more multivariate polynomials defined
over a finite field F.
I Definition 19 (Algebraic set). For any s polynomials f1, . . . , fs ∈ F[x1, . . . , xn], the set
V (f1, . . . , fs) = {x ∈ Fn|fi(x) = 0,∀i ∈ [s]} is an algebraic set. We say V is an algebraic set
of degree d, if each polynomial fi has degree at most d.
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An algebraic source is a random variable distributed uniformly over an algebraic set as
initially defined by Dvir [9].
I Definition 20 (Algebraic source). An algebraic source is the uniform distribution UV over
an algebraic set V . If V is a degree-d algebraic set, then we say UV is an algebraic source of
degree d.
I Definition 21 (Algebraic extractor). We say that Ext : Fn → Fm is a (k, d, )-algebraic
extractor if for any degree-d algebraic source UV with |V | ≥ |F|k, Ext(UV ) ≈ Um.
I Definition 22 (Linear codes over prime fields). For a prime q, a linear code of length n and
dimension k is a k-dimensional linear subspace C of the vector space Fnq . If the distance of
the code C is d, i.e., the minimum number of two codewords in which they differ, we say that
C is an [n, k, d]q code. A family of codes {Cn} is asymptotically good if there exist constants
0 < δ1, δ2 < 1 s.t. k ≥ δ1n and d ≥ δ2n.
Note that every linear code has an associated generating matrix M ∈ Fk×nq , and every
codeword can be expressed as vM , for some vector v ∈ Fkq . There are explicit constructions
of asymptotically good linear codes, such as the Justensen codes over GF(2) constructed in
[14] and the expander codes over GF(q) in [1] for any prime q.
I Definition 23 (Correlation over prime fields). Let f, g : Fnq → Fq be two functions over n
inputs. The correlation between f and g with respect to the uniform distribution is defined as
Cor(f, g) := |Eeq[f(x) + g(x)]| ∈ [0, 1],
where eq[x] := wx for x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, where w denotes the q-th root of unity.
For a class C of functions, we denote by Cor(f, C) the maximum of Cor(f, C) over all C ∈ C
whose domain is the same as f .
Furthermore, when q = 2, we have e2[x] = (−1)x, and Cor(f, g) =
|Pr[f(x) = g(x)]− Pr[f(x) 6= g(x)]|. We often write e2[x] as e[x] for convenience.
I Definition 24 (f (m), fv). For any function f : Fnq → Fq, let f (m) denote the concatenation
of m copies of f , i.e., f (m)(x1, x2, . . . , xm) := (f(x1), . . . , f(xm)), where x1, . . . , xm ∈ Fnq .
For each v = (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fmq , let fv denote the linear combination of m copies of f
according to v, i.e., fv(x1, x2, . . . , xm) :=
∑
i∈[m] vif(xi).
Let F∗q = Fq \ {0} denotes the set of non-zero elements in Fq. We remark that the
statistical XOR lemma has been generalized to prime fields by e.g., Goldreich [11].
I Lemma 25 (Statistical XOR Lemma over Fq). Let X = (X1, . . . , Xm) be random vector
over Fmq such that for any nonzero vector v = (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fmq \ {0m}, the random variable
v ·X = ∑i∈[m] viXi is -biased. Then, the distribution of (X1, . . . , Xm) is qm/2-close to the
uniform distribution over Fmq .
For example, when m = 1, for a random variable X over Fq, to show that X ≈ UFq , we
need to show that bias(αX) ≤ /√q for each α ∈ F∗q .
4.2 Seed-extending PRGs
I Definition 26 (Flip-invariant family). We say a boolean function family C over n bits is
flip-invariant if for any string s ∈ {0, 1}n, f ∈ C implies f(x⊕ s) ∈ C.
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I Definition 27 (Seed-extending pseudorandom generator). A seed-extending pseudorandom
generator is a generator G that outputs the seed as part of the pseudorandom string.
Formally, a seed-extending (d, )-pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n for a
class of functions over n bits, is a seed-extending function, i.e., G(s) = (s, E(s)) for some
function E, such that
|Pr[f(G(Ud)) = 1]− Pr[f(Un) = 1]| ≤ .
5 From XOR Amplification to Extractors for Recognizable Sources
First we define XOR amplification for a boolean function class that contains functions with
various input lengths. Recall that f⊕m(x1, . . . , xm) =
⊕
i∈[m] f(xi).
I Definition 28 (α-XOR amplification for a boolean function class). Let C ⊆ {{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}} be a class of boolean functions. For a positive constant α, we say C has α-XOR
amplification if there exists a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} such that for any positive integer k,
Cor(h⊕k, g) ≤ 2−αk, for any g ∈ C.
However, for constructing extractors for n-bit recognizable sources, we need to focus on the
specific subset Cn ⊆ C that contains all n-variate functions in C. We define XOR amplification
for Cn to also allow fixing some input bits.
I Definition 29 ((α,w)-XOR amplification for functions with a fixed input length). For a set
Cn of n-variate functions C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a positive constant α, we say Cn has
(α,w)-XOR amplification for a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} if for any vector v ∈ {0, 1}bn/tc
with at least w ones, Cor(hv, Cn) ≤ 2−αw, where we add dummy variables to the input of hv
if hv has less than n input variables.
Moreover, we say Cn has α-XOR amplification for h, if Cn has (α,w)-XOR amplification
for h for each positive integer w ≤ bn/tc.
Note that if C is closed under restrictions, the fact that C has α-XOR amplification implies
that Cn has also α-XOR amplification for every positive integer n. Formally,
I Lemma 30. Let C ⊆ {{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}} be a class of boolean functions closed under
restrictions. Let Cn ⊆ C denote the set of all n-variate functions in C. If C has α-XOR
amplification for a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}, then Cn has also α-XOR amplification for h
for every positive integer n.
Proof. Assume that C has α-XOR amplification for a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}, i.e.,
Cor(h⊕k, C) ≤ 2−αk for each positive integer k. Then, we need to prove that for every positive
integer n, Cn has also α-XOR amplification for h. In particular, fix n and let l = bn/tc. It
suffices to prove that for any vector v ∈ {0, 1}l with k ones, Cor(hv, Cn) ≤ Cor(h⊕k, C), as
Cor(h⊕k, C) ≤ 2−αk.
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To prove this, without loss of generality, assume that the first k coordinates of v are all
1’s, and the remaining coordinates are all 0’s. Thus, hv depends only on the first kt variables.
For any n-variate function C(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Cn,
Cor(hv, C) = EX∼Ukt,Y∼Un−kte[hv(X,Y ) + C(X,Y )]
= EY∼Un−kt [EX∼Ukte[hv(X,Y ) + C(X,Y )]]
≤ 12n−kt
∑
Y0∈{0,1}n−kt
Cor
(
h⊕k(X), C(X,Y0)
)
≤ 12n−kt
∑
Y0∈{0,1}n−kt
Cor(h⊕k, C)
= Cor(h⊕k, C).
The last inequality follows since C is closed under restrictions, i.e., C(X,Y0) ∈ C for any
Y0 ∈ {0, 1}n−kt. J
I Theorem 31. Let Cn be a family of boolean functions over n bits containing the constant
function f(x) = 0. For any positive integers n,m, t, let M be the l ×m generating matrix
of an asymptotically good [l,m, r0]2 code, where l = n/t. Assume that Cn has (α, r)-XOR
amplification for h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}, where r ≤ r0. Then, the function Ext : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m,
Ext(x) = h(l)(x)M,
is an (n−∆, 2m/2+∆−αr) extractor for Cn-recognizable sources.
Proof. For convenience, let (g1(x), . . . , gm(x)) = h(l)(x)M . To show that the output of Ext
is 2m/2+∆−αr-closed to the uniform, by the statistical XOR Lemma, it suffices to show that
for any non-empty set S ⊆ [m], gS =
∑
i∈S gi is 2∆−αr-biased conditioned on f(x) = 1 for
any f ∈ Cn with |f−1(1)| ≥ 2n−∆.
First we observe that the bias of gS conditioned on f(x) = 1 can be bounded by the
correlation between gS and f plus the bias of gS .
I Lemma 32 (Lemma 15, restated).
|Pr[gS(X) = 1|f(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 0|f(X) = 1]| ≤ Cor(gS , f) + bias(gS)2 Pr[f(X) = 1] .
Proof. By multiplying 2 Pr[f(X) = 1] on both sides, it is equivalent to prove that
2 |Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 1]| ≤ Cor(gS , f) + bias(gS).
Notice that
Cor(gS , f) = |Pr[gS(X) = f(X)]− Pr[gS(X) 6= f(X)]|
= |Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 1] + Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 0]
− Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 0]|,
and
bias(gS) = |Pr[gS(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 0]|
= |Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 1] + Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 0]
− Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 0]|.
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Thus, by the triangle inequality,
bias(gS) + Cor(gS , f) ≥ |2 Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 1]− 2 Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 1]|
= 2 |Pr[gS(X) = 1 ∧ f(X) = 1]− Pr[gS(X) = 0 ∧ f(X) = 1]| . J
Then, observe that not only is each gi a sum of at least r independent copies, but also so
is any non-empty sum of the gi, and hence has exponentially small correlation with degree-d
polynomials.
I Lemma 33. For any nonempty set S ⊆ [m], Cor(gS , Cn) ≤ 2−αr.
Proof. Note that
gS(x) =
∑
i∈S
h(l)(x)Mi = h(l)(x)
(∑
i∈S
Mi
)
,
whereMi denotes the i-th row of the matrixM . AsM is the generating matrix of an [l,m, r]2
code and S is non-empty,
∑
i∈SMi is a codeword and hence has at least r 1’s. Thus, gS is
the XOR of at least r0 independent copies of h. By the assumed (α, r)-XOR amplification,
we know Cor(gS , Cn) ≤ 2−αr. J
Since the constant function 0 ∈ Cn, we also have that bias(gS) = Cor(gS , 0) ≤ 2−αr.
Thus, by Lemma 32, the bias of gS conditioned on f(x) = 1 is at most 2−αr/p, where
p = Pr[f(X) = 1].
At last, we have p = |f
−1(1)|
2n ≥ 2−∆ by the min-entropy requirement that |f−1(1)| ≥ 2n−∆.
Therefore, gS(x) is 2∆−αr-biased conditioned on f(x) = 1. J
Combining with an explicit asymptotically good [l,m, r]2 code, we prove the following
theorem.
I Theorem 34. Let C ⊆ {{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}} be any boolean function class closed under
restrictions and α be any positive constant. Let Cn denote the set of all n-variate functions
in C. If Cn has (α, δn)-XOR amplification for h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}, where δ < 1/t is a positive
constant, then there is an explicit (n− c1αl, 2−c2αl) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}c3αl for
Cn-recognizable sources, where l = n/t and c1, c2, c3 are some positive constants.
Moreover, if C has α-XOR amplification for a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}, then for any
positive integer n, there is an explicit seedless (n− c1αl, 2−c2αl) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}c3αl for Cn-recognizable sources, where l = n/t and c1, c2, c3 are some positive constants.
Proof. Note that if C has α-XOR amplification for a function h, then by Lemma 30, Cn also
has α-XOR amplification for h for every positive integer n, i.e., Cn also has (α, δl)-XOR
amplification for h by definition. Now, we start with the assumption that Cn has (α, δl)-XOR
amplification for h. We use an explicit [l, δ1l, δ2l]2 linear code for some constants δ1 > 0 and
δ2 > δ by Justesen [14]. Therefore, Theorem 31 yields an (n−∆, 2m/2+∆−αδ2l) extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m for Cn-recognizable sources. That is, by setting ∆ = c1αl and
m = c3αl for some small positive constants c1, c3, we get the desired (n − c1αl, 2−c2αl)
extractor, where c2 = −(c3/2 + c1 − δ2) > 0 is also a positive constant. J
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6 From Seed-Extending PRGs to Extractors for Recognizable Sources
Note that Kinne et al. [16] already showed reductions between extractors for recognizable
sources and seed-extending PRGs.
I Lemma 35 ([16, Theorem 7]). Let C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be a function. Let
∆ = m + log(1/) and let E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be an (n − ∆, 2−∆)-extractor for C-
recognizable distributions, where each function in C is of the form fr(x) = C(x, r) where
r ∈ {0, 1}m is an arbitrary string. Then, G(x) = (x,E(x)) is -pseudorandom for C.
I Lemma 36 ([16, Theorem 8]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function and let E : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m be a function such that G(x) = (x,E(x)) is -pseudorandom for tests T (x, r) of the
form Tz(x, r) = f(x) ∧ (r = z) where z ∈ {0, 1}m is an arbitrary string. For any ∆ > 0, if
 ≤ 2−(m+2∆) then E is an (n−∆, 2−∆)-extractor for the distribution recognized by f .
The Lemma 3.2 requires a tiny  ≤ 2−(m+2∆) for the seed-extending PRG to get an
(n − ∆, 2−∆)-extractor. In the following, we improve the reduction from seed-extending
PRGs to extractors to require only  ≤ 2−2∆. Moreover, our extractor is even stronger –
the output of our extractor is close to uniform with relative error, which will be defined
as follows.
I Definition 37 (Statistical distance with relative error). We say that a distribution Z on
{0, 1}m is -close to uniform with relative error if for every event A ⊆ {0, 1}m,
|Pr[Z ∈ A]− µ(A)| ≤  · µ(A), where µ(A) = |A|/2m.
Note that if Z is -close to uniform with relative error, then it is also -close to uniform.
Next we define extractors with relative error analogously.
I Definition 38 (Seedless extractor with relative error, [2, Definition 1.19]). Let C be a class
of distributions over {0, 1}n. A function Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a (k, )-relative-error
extractor for C if for every distribution X in the class C such that H∞(X) ≥ k, Ext(X) is
-close to uniform with relative error.
We remark that the notions of statistical distance and extractors with relative error were
introduced by Applebaum, Artemenko, Shaltiel, and Yang [2]. They translate relative-error
extractors for distributions recognizable by small circuits into incompressible functions.
However, parameters of our relative-error extractors are not strong enough to get incom-
pressible functions.
Now we prove the reduction lemma from seed-extending PRGs to seedless extractors with
relative error, which directly implies the reduction from seed-extending PRGs to seedless
extractors.
I Lemma 39. Let C be a flip-invariant family of boolean functions over n bits. If G is a
seed-extending (d, )-pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n, then we can construct an
(n−∆, 2∆)-relative-error extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−d as follows. If G(x) = (x,E(x))
fools any function in C, then Ext(x ◦ y) = y⊕E(x) is an extractor for C-recognizable sources,
where x ∈ {0, 1}d, y ∈ {0, 1}n−d.
For intuition, observe that a seedless extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m partitions {0, 1}n
as
⋃
z∈{0,1}m Ext
−1(z). If Ext is a (k, )-relative-error extractor for C-recognizable sources,
then for every f ∈ C with |f−1(1)| ≥ 2k, all intersections Ext−1(z)∩f−1(1) should have almost
the same size. That is, for most m-bit strings z, the preimage Ext−1(z) is an -pseudorandom
set against any f ∈ C with |f−1(1)| ≥ 2k.
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Now, given PRGs, how to construct extractors? From the above observation, converting
an -pseudorandom set into a partition of -pseudorandom sets is a possible way. If each
preimage Ext−1(z) of Ext is an -pseudorandom set for C, Ext should be a relative-error
extractor for C-recognizable sources with a bit worse parameters, which will be precisely
calculated in the following formal proof.
To make Ext−1(z) an -pseudorandom set for each z, we need a PRG of the specific
form: G(x) = B(x) ◦ E(x), for some bijection B : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d and some function
E : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n−d. By linearly shifting the set {(B(x), E(x))}, we can partition {0, 1}n
as
⋃
z∈{0,1}n−d
{
(B(x), (E(x)⊕ z)) : x ∈ {0, 1}d}. Since C is a flip-invariant function family,
we have that the set Ext−1(z) =
{
(B(x), (E(x)⊕ z)) : x ∈ {0, 1}d} fools any function f in C.
Note that to convert the PRG of the form (B(x), E(x)) into an extractor, the above
intuition gives Ext(x) = E(B−1(x)). Thus, to get an efficient extractor, we have to assume
that E(B−1(x)) can be efficiently computed. That is, the PRG of the form (B(x), E(x)) also
gives an efficient seed-extending PRG (x,E(B−1(x))). Therefore, for constructing extractors
from the above intuition, we only need to focus on the seed-extending PRGs.
Proof. For convenience, let m = n− d denote the output length of Ext.
First, we observe that, for any fixed z, Gz(x) = (x, (E(x)⊕z)) fools any function f(x, y) in
C. Notice that to prove Gz(x) fools f(x, y), it is equivalent to prove (x,E(x)) fools f(x, y⊕z).
Because of the flip-invariant property of C, we know if f(x, y) ∈ C, then f(x, y ⊕ z) ∈ C. So
G(x) = x ◦ E(x) fools f(x, y ⊕ z). That is, Gz(x) fools the function f(x, y).
Note that Ext−1(z) is the range of Gz. Then, we can get
Pr[Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z|f(X ◦ Y ) = 1]
=Pr[Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z ∧ f(X ◦ Y ) = 1]Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1]
=Pr[Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z]Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1] Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1|Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z]
=Pr[Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z]Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1] Pr[f(Gz(X)) = 1]
=Pr[Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z]Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1] (Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1]± )
=p± 
p
Pr[Ext(X ◦ Y ) = z], where p = Pr[f(X ◦ Y ) = 1],
=p± 
p
1
2m .
For any nonempty subset S ⊆ {0, 1}m, summing over all z ∈ S, we deduce that the output
of Ext is pµ(S)-close to the uniform distribution over S. Furthermore, we have

p ≤ 2∆,
since p = |f
−1(1)|
2n ≥ 2−∆ by the min-entropy requirement that |f−1(1)| ≥ 2n−∆. Therefore,
Ext(x◦y) = y⊕E(x) is an (n−∆, 2∆)-relative-error extractor for C-recognizable sources. J
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A Application of Theorem 2
A.1 Algebraic extractors over GF(2)
In this subsection, we will show that for any algebraic sources of constant degree over
GF(2), there exists an efficient extractor that has linear output for linear min-entropy and
exponentially small error. Formally, we will prove the following theorem:
I Theorem 40. For any positive integer d, there is an efficient
(
(1− 1/cd)n, d, 2−Ω(n/cd)
)
-
algebraic extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where cd = Θ(d24d), m = Ω(n/cd).
Let Pd denote the set of all polynomials of degree at most d over GF(2). Let Vd denote the
set of all products of polynomials in Pd and Vd,n denote the set of all products of n-variate
polynomials in Pd.
Notice that an algebraic source of degree d over n bits is also a Vd,n-recognizable source.
I Lemma 41. An n-bit algebraic source of degree d iff it is a Vd,n-recognizable source.
Proof. Let UV denote an arbitrary algebraic source, where V = {x ∈ {0, 1}n|pi(x) = 0, pi ∈
Pd,∀i ∈ [k]} is an algebraic set of degree d over n bits. Notice that V can be viewed as the
set of 1-inputs of function
∏
i∈[k](pi(x) + 1). That is, the uniform distribution over V is also
the source recognizable by
∏
i∈[k](pi(x) + 1) ∈ Vd,n. In other words, an algebraic source of
degree d is a Vd,n-recognizable source.
For the other direction, let Uf denote an arbitrary Vd,n-recognizable source, where f =∏
i∈[k] pi ∈ Vd,n with deg(pi) ≤ d for each i ∈ [k]. Note that f−1(1) = {x ∈ {0, 1}n|pi(x) =
1,∀i ∈ [k]} = {x ∈ {0, 1}n|pi(x) + 1 = 0,∀i ∈ [k]}. Hence, f−1(1) is the algebraic set
of p1(x) + 1, . . . , pk(x) + 1. Since deg(pi(x) + 1) = deg(pi) ≤ d for each i ∈ [k], f−1(1)
is an algebraic set of degree d over n bits. Therefore, Uf is an n-bit algebraic source of
degree d. J
Then, observe that Vd is closed under restrictions. Thus, by Theorem 31, to get an
extractor for Vd,n-recognizable sources, it is enough to show that Vd has α-XOR amplification
for some positive constant α.
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Note that to show that a function f has low correlations with Vd, it suffices to show that
f has low correlation with any polynomial of degree at most d. Recall that the correlation
between a function f and a class C of functions is defined as the maximum of Cor(f, C)
over all C ∈ C whose input length is the same as f . In particular, to show that a function
f : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} has low correlations with Vd, it suffices to show that f has low correlation
with any t-variate polynomial of degree at most d.
I Lemma 42. If a function f : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} is -correlated with any polynomial of degree
at most d in t variables, then f is at most 2-correlated with any product of polynomials of
degree at most d in t variables.
The lemma follows because the L1 norm of the Fourier transform of the AND function is at
most 2.
Proof. We need to show that if for any t-variate p ∈ Pd Cor(f, p) = |Ee [f + p]| ≤ , then
for any product
∏
i∈[k](pi + 1) ∈ Vd,t where p1 + 1, . . . , pk + 1 ∈ Pd,t, we have
Cor
f, ∏
i∈[k]
(pi(X) + 1)
 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ee
f + ∏
i∈[k]
(pi(X) + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2.
Consider the Fourier expansion of the function
e
∏
i∈[k]
(yi + 1)
 = −∑
S 6=∅
e
[∑
i∈S yi
]
2k−1 + (1− 1/2
k−1).
Now, substituting each yi by pi, we have e
[∏
i∈[k](pi + 1)
]
= −∑S 6=∅ e[∑i∈S pi]2k−1 + (1 −
1/2k−1).
That is,∣∣∣∣∣∣Ee
f + ∏
i∈[k]
(pi(X) + 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
S 6=∅
∣∣Ee [f +∑i∈S pi(X)]∣∣
2k−1 .
Notice that for each S 6= ∅, the sum ∑j∈S pi is also a polynomial of degree at most d. For
the polynomial of degree at most d,
∑
j∈S pi, we have that
∣∣∣Ee [f +∑j∈S pi(X)]∣∣∣ ≤ . In
other words,
∣∣∣Ee [f +∏i∈[k](pi(X) + 1)]∣∣∣ ≤ 2k 22k−1 = 4. J
Moreover, Viola and Wigderson [30] proved XOR amplification for GF(2) polynomials,
which implies XOR amplification for Vd by Lemma 42.
I Theorem 43 ([30, Theorem 1.1]). Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function such that
Cor(h, Pd,n) ≤ 1− 1/2d. Then Cor(h⊕m, Pd) ≤ 2−Ω(m/(4d·d)).
Finally, by brute force search, it is easy to find a function h over O(d) bits such that
Cor(h, Pd) ≤ 1− 1/2d as d is a constant. That is, Pd has Ω( 14d·d )-XOR amplification for the
function h : {0, 1}O(d) → {0, 1}. This implies that Vd has Ω( 14d·d ) -XOR amplification for
the function h : {0, 1}O(d) → {0, 1} by Lemma 42. Therefore, Theorem 34 yields our main
theorem of this subsection, i.e., constructing an efficient
(
(1− 1/cd)n, d, 2−Ω(n/cd)
)
-algebraic
extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where cd = Θ(d24d), m = Ω(n/cd).
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We remark that an explicit example of h is the mod3 function, which outputs 1 if and only
if the number of input bits that are ‘1’ is congruent to 1 modulo 3. Smolensky [26] proved
that the mod3 function over O(d2) bits is 2/3-hard for Pd (see Viola [28] for a proof), that
is, Pd has Ω( 14d·d )-XOR amplification for the function mod3 : {0, 1}O(d
2) → {0, 1}. Using the
mod3 function, Theorem 34 yields an efficient
(
(1− 1/c′d)n, d, 2−Ω(n/c
′
d)
)
-algebraic extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where c′d = Θ(d34d), m = Ω(n/c′d).
A.2 Sources recognizable by communication protocols
In this subsection, we construct an extractor for sources recognizable by randomized t-party
protocols. Formally, we prove the following theorem.
I Theorem 44. There exists an explicit seedless ((1 − 1/ct)n, 2−c1n/ct) extractor Ext :({0, 1}n/t)t → {0, 1}c2n/ct for sources recognizable by randomized t-party communication
protocols of at most c3n/ct bits, where ct = Θ(t4t) and c1, c2, c3 are some positive constants.
Let RCCn,t,w denote the class of n-variate randomized t-party protocols using at most w
communication bits. Now, to construct extractors for RCCn,t,w-recognizable sources with
exponentially small error, by Theorem 31, it suffices to show RCCn,t,w has (α, r)−XOR
amplification for some function h, where r = Ω(n) is the distance of some good linear code.
Notice that, Babai, Nisan, and Szegedy [3] proved a lower bound for randomized t-party
protocols for the Generalized Inner Product (GIP) function, which is the XOR of AND
functions. Formally, let ∧t : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} denote the AND function on t variables.
Then, the GIP function GIPkt : ({0, 1}t)k → {0, 1} is defined as the function∧⊕kt , i.e.,
GIPkt(x1, . . . , xk) :=
⊕k
i=1 ∧t(xi). Moreover, let Rt,(f) denote the complexity of the best
randomized t-party protocol correlating f with at least .
I Theorem 45 ([3, Theorem 2]).
Rt,(GIPn) = Ω
( n
4t − log(1/)
)
.
Now, for any constant 0 < δ < 1/t and some constant ct = Θ(t4t), we prove that
RCCn,t,O(n/4t) has (Ω(1/ct), δn)−XOR amplification for ∧t, which directly yields Theorem
44 by Theorem 34.
I Proposition 46. For any constant 0 < δ < 1/t, RCCn,t,c′n/4t has (c/ct, δn)−XOR ampli-
fication for ∧t, where ct = Θ(t4t), c, c′ > 0 are constants.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that RCCn,t,c′n/4t does not have (c/ct, δn)−XOR ampli-
fication for ∧t, where c, c′ are some constants to be decided later. That is, there exists
some vector v ∈ {0, 1}n/t with at least δn ones, Cor(hv,RCCn,t,c′n/4t) ≤ 2−
c
ct
δn, That is,
there exists a (c′n/4t)-bit randomized protocol that approximates hv within 2−
c
ct
δn error.
Furthermore, observe that hv is the XOR of at least δn copies of ∧t, i.e, hv depends on ≥ δnt
variables. Therefore, by Theorem 45, we have
R
t,2−
c
ct
δn(hv) ≥ R
t,2−
c
ct
δn(GIPδn) = Ω
(
δ
n
4t −
c
ct
δnt
)
.
That is, letting the constant c be small enough, we know there exists a positive constant c′′
such that
Rt,2−αδn(hv) ≥ c′′n/4t.
Now letting c′ < c′′ yields a contraction. Therefore, RCCn,t,c′n/4t has (c/ct, δn)−XOR
amplification for ∧t. J
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A.3 Halfspace sources
In this subsection, for halfspace sources, we construct an efficient extractor that has linear
output for linear min-entropy and exponentially small error. Formally, we will prove the
following theorem.
I Theorem 47. There exists an explicit seedless ((1− c1)n, 2−c2n) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}c3n for halfspace sources, where c1, c2, c3 are some positive small enough constants.
Note that Nisan already proved an exponentially small correlation bound for Inner
Product function against LTFs. Formally, let IPn : ({0, 1}2)n/2 → {0, 1} denote the inner
product function over n variables, i.e., IPn(x1, . . . , xn/2) =
⊕
i∈[n/2] ∧2(xi). Then, we have
the following lemma.
I Lemma 48. For any LTF f on n variables, we have
Cor(IPn, f) ≤ 2−Ω(n).
Proof of sketch. Nisan proved that a LTF on n variables can be approximated within  error
by a randomized 2-party protocol of complexity O(log(n/)) by [19, Theorem 1]. Moreover,
by Chor and Goldreich [7], we know at least n/2− log(1/) complexity needed for randomized
2-party protocol computing the function IPn.
Therefore, for any LTF f over n variables, there is a protocol P of complexity cn bits
approximating f within 2−Ω(n) error and Cor(IPn,P) ≤ 2−Ω(n). That is, replacing f by
IPn in Cor(IPn, f), we can bound Cor(IPn, f) ≤ 2−Ω(n) + Cor(IPn,P) = 2−Ω(n). J
Let LT Fn denote the class of LTFs over n variables. Then, the above lemma directly
yields that LT Fn has (α, δn)-XOR amplification for ∧2 for any positive constant δ < 1/2,
where α is some positive constant. Hence Theorem 47 directly follows by Theorem 34.
B Application of Theorem 8
In this section, we construct extractors for sources recognized by several widely used function
families. These constructions are all based on Lemma 39 proved in the previous section, which
means we can convert seed-extending PRGs into extractors. In the following subsections, the
main points are to construct seed-extending PRGs for some specific common function families.
B.1 Circuit-recognizable sources
Recall that we say a function h : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} is -hard for C if Cor(h, C) ≤ .
For any circuit family, Nisan and Wigderson [20] already constructed a hardness-based
PRG. Reviewing the NW generator, Kinne et al. [16] proved that it could be made seed-
extending, and hence they gave a seed-extending PRG for circuits. In particular, they proved
the following lemma.
I Lemma 49 ([16, Lemma 2.9]). Let l and m be positive integers and H : {0, 1}
√
l/2 → {0, 1}
a function. If H is m -hard at input length
√
l/2 for circuits of size s+m · 2O(logm/ log l) and
depth d+ 1, then there is a seed-extending (l, )-PRG NWH;l,m : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l+m for tests
T : {0, 1}l+m → {0, 1} computable by circuits of size s and depth d.
Notice that the set of bounded-size circuits is flip-invariant since flipping the inputs of a
circuit does not change its size. Thus, applying Lemma 39, we get an extractor.
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I Proposition 50. For any positive integer l < n, if there is a function H that is -hard at
input length
√
l/2 for circuits of size s+ (n− l) · 2O(log(n−l)/ log l) and depth d+ 1, then for
any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0 we can get an (n−∆, (n− l)2∆)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l for
any sources recognizable by circuits of size s and depth d.
We remark that, in the best case, the above lemma yields an (n−O˜(√l), 2−Ω˜(
√
l))-extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l, if we can get a function at input length √l/2 which is 2−Ω˜(
√
l)-hard
for circuits of polynomial size.
B.2 AC0-ecognizable sources
Hastad [13] proved that the parity function is 2−n1/(d+1)-hard against any AC0 circuit of
size 2n1/(d+1) and depth d. Based on this hardness, Shaltiel [25] constructed extractors for
AC0-recognizable sources.
I Theorem 51 (Corollary 4.25, [25]). For any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0, there is a constant α > 0
such that for every sufficiently large n, m ≤ n1/(αd), and sources recognizable by circuits of
size 2n1/(αd) and depth d, we can construct an (n−n1/(αd), 2−100m)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m.
I Theorem 52 (Theorem 4.21, [25]). For any constants c, d, e > 1 there is a constant
d′ > 1 and a uniform family E = {En} of circuits of polynomial-size and depth d′ such that
En : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m for m(n) = (logn)e and En is a (n− 100m(n), 2−100m(n))-extractor
for sources recognizable by circuits of size nc and depth d.
However, directly using the Lemma 50 with the hardness of parity function, we can get
the following lemma.
I Theorem 53. For any ∆ = ∆(n) > 0, there exists a polynomial time computable (n −
∆, (n− l)2∆−Ω(l1/(2d+2))) extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−l for any sources recognizable by
circuits of size 2n1/d and depth d.
I Proposition 54. For any constants c, d, e > 1 there is a constant e′ < e and a polynomial-
time computable uniform family E = {En} such that En : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m for m(n) =
n− (logn)e and En is a (n− 100(logn)e′ , 2−100(logn)e
′
)-extractor for sources recognizable by
circuits of size nc and depth d.
In particular, for min-entropy n − n1/(αd), our extractor outputs n − n2/α+O(1/d) bits,
whereas Shaltiel’s extractor outputs only n1/(αd) bits. When α > 2d/(d−1) is a large enough
constant, our extractor outputs n−o(n) bits whereas Shaltiel’s extractor outputs only n1/(αd)
bits. For min-entropy n − polylog(n) bits, our extractor outputs n − polylog(n), whereas
Shaltiel’s extractor outputs only polylog(n) bits
For circuit sources, Viola [29] also constructed extractors for AC0-samplable sources,
extracting k(k/n1+γ)O(1) bits with super-polynomially small error from n-bit sources of
min-entropy k, for any γ > 0. Nevertheless, AC0-samplable sources are different from
AC0-recognizable sources.
